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The Syrian Civil War is a conflict of 
which the consequences will be felt for 
generations.  It began in March 2011 during 
the Arab Spring protests against Syrian 
President Basher al-Assad.  Al-Assad and 
his father, Hafez, are Alawites, a minority 
Shi’a sect, ruling over the majority Sunni 
population of Syria since 1970.  Rising 
income inequality as a result of Baathist 
statism, dissatisfaction with 
authoritarianism, increasing corruption, and 
a lack of jobs brought Syrians into the 
streets.  There were nationwide 
demonstrations in major cities throughout 
Syria.  In response, the Assad regime 
deployed the Syrian Army to quell the 
uprising with soldiers firing on 
demonstrators.  After months of military 
sieges, the protests evolved into armed 
rebellion.  On one side was the Baathist 
government of Assad, on the other were 
opposition forces composed of army 
defectors and civilian volunteers. 
As the conflict grew, Al-Qaeda and 
ISIS made their presence known.  Due to 
Al-Qaeda and ISIS involvement, the Syrian 
government lost large swaths of eastern 
Syria.  Moreover, Hezbollah, Iran, Turkey, 
Saudi Arabia, and the Gulf Emirates, along 
with Russia and the United States, took 
interest in the sectarian struggle.  By 2016, 
approximately 400,000 Syrians had been 
killed and more than 3.8 million Syrians fled 
as refugees. 
The causes of the Syrian Civil War 
are publicly expressed as sectarianism, anti-
authoritarianism, and poor economic and 
agricultural policies (Gleick, 2014; Lesch, 
2017).  Armed conflict can cause problems 
beyond regional instability, violence, and 
food insecurity, however. It can also impact 
the health of people living in the conflict-
ridden countries, as well as people living in 
the countries hosting large numbers of 
migrants. The latter problem is the subject of 
this paper. With hundreds of thousands of 
people migrating from Syria into Europe, 
European governments are now facing 
challenges of how to deal with re-emerging 
diseases like cutaneous leishmaniasis. What 
impact will migration have on the presence 
of infectious diseases in the EU?  How can 
EU member states simultaneously address 
security and public health concerns resulting 
from forced migration? 
Drawing upon existing 
environmental security and public health 
literatures, we hypothesise that the increased 
prevalence of infectious diseases occurs as a 
result of public health breakdowns during 
and following armed conflict.  Moreover, 
mass migration leads to the emerging and 
re-emerging of infectious diseases in a host 
country. While the Syrian refugee crisis has 
put real and imagined strains on EU member 
states’ immigration systems, a coordinated 
policy response, as outlined below, will 
mitigate the crisis and offer solutions for a 
way forward. 
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Conflict and Health Literature Review 
Political scientists have studied the 
impact that conflict has on a number of 
elements of the political sphere, including 
how it impacts the health of the individuals 
in the affected region. Armed conflict 
impacts health through destruction of 
infrastructure, flight of health care workers, 
interruptions in vaccination programs, 
disruption in infection control practices, and 
decreases in governmental health funding 
(Gayer, et al., 2007). These breakdowns do 
not only increase the risk of chronic 
diseases, they also open the door for 
problems with acute infectious disease 
outbreaks.  Looking first at the problem of 
infrastructure destruction, many war-torn 
countries throughout the world have 
experienced the destruction of their health 
care facilities and supplies (Kalipeni & 
Oppong, 1998). This is particularly true in 
places that experience high levels of 
bombing, like Syria.  In heavily bombed 
areas, health care facilities are fully or 
partially destroyed. Even if the facility is 
only partially destroyed, it may no longer be 
able to adequately function to care for 
patients.   
This problem with a lack of access to 
health care can also refer to possible fear of 
traveling to a still existing health care 
facility because of a threat of violence.  This 
means that many people wait until their 
disease has progressed significantly before 
seeking help. The longer an individual waits 
to seek treatment for an infectious disease, 
the more likely it is that the disease will 
spread. In some cases, they may even try to 
treat the disease themselves as Gele and 
Bjune (2010) found to be the case with 
tuberculosis patients in conflict zones. With 
almost all infectious diseases affecting 
conflict-ridden regions, it is not possible to 
treat the disease without seeking 
professional medical care and failing to do 
so continues to put the infected individual 
and the rest of their community at risk.  
In addition to the destruction of 
health care facilities and supplies, many 
countries affected by conflict lose their 
trained health care workers as they flee with 
other refugees and migrants (Kalipeni and 
Oppong, 1998; Gayer, et al., 2007). Once 
properly trained health professionals begin 
to leave the country, individuals still living 
in-country no longer have access to adequate 
care.   This creates a different, but equally 
troubling problem. Even if the hospital or 
clinic is still functioning, individuals in the 
country are still not able to receive 
appropriate care.  The personnel left 
working the hospitals and clinics may not be 
able to recognise many infectious diseases 
and, even if they can identify the disease, 
they may not have any knowledge about 
appropriate treatment procedures 
(Beracochea, et al., 1995; Thaver, et al., 
1998). Inappropriate or incomplete 
treatment procedures, particularly ones that 
use antibiotics, can create anti-microbial 
resistant strains of the disease.  
Infectious disease also becomes a 
problem in countries with sustained armed 
conflict because fighting disrupts 
vaccination and infection control programs. 
Many developing countries have made great 
strides in improving vaccine coverage for 
diseases like polio; however, once armed 
conflict erupts it can be extremely difficult 
to continue regular vaccinations.  This 
problem was seen after the 2001 US 
invasion of Afghanistan, where vaccination 
rates in areas of high conflict remain much 
lower than rates in the rest of the country 
because vaccine campaign workers are 
targeted by armed groups (Norris, et al., 
2016). Even the simple logistical difficulties 
of a vaccine campaign in areas of conflict 
can make conducting the campaign 
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impossible. The logistical challenges of 
getting vaccines into areas of conflict has 
led to lack of vaccination in Somalia, 
Pakistan, and Ethiopia (Pallansch and 
Sandhu, 2006). As armed conflict leads to 
falling vaccination rates, more people begin 
suffering and dying from vaccine-
preventable diseases. 
Countries plagued with sustained 
armed conflict also see a decrease in the 
amount of government resources dedicated 
to health. “Long-term consequences of civil 
war can affect entire countries (such as 
Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
or Afghanistan) because of chronic lack of 
investment in health, education, and public 
works” (Gayer, et al., 2007, p. 1625). 
Money that may have originally been 
allocated for public health or infectious 
disease control programs can, and often is, 
redirected to the war efforts. What 
sometimes becomes a chronic lack of health 
funding only exacerbates the problems of 
infrastructure destruction, loss of trained 
personnel, and the breakdown of vaccine 
programs.  
Although armed conflict has 
numerous in-country impacts, it doesn’t only 
impact the internal health of a country. The 
movement of large amounts of the 
population leads to the development of 
refugee camps and a whole new set of 
infectious disease prevention challenges. 
Despite best efforts, many of the refugee 
camps are “fertile ground for outbreaks of 
re-surging old scourges and newly emerging 
infectious disease” (Kalipeni and Oppong, 
1998). The clustering of mass numbers of 
individuals that likely struggled for some 
time without adequate health care creates the 
perfect breeding ground for diseases like 
yellow fever, cholera, tuberculosis and 
Ebola. Refugee camps serve as a particularly 
good place for cholera outbreaks, due to the 
lack of adequate waste disposal.   
Even if refugee camps are working 
to keep conditions as sanitary as possible 
and make sure incoming residents are 
properly protected through vaccination 
programs, the massive overcrowding that 
often exists in these camps can cause large 
outbreaks under the right circumstances. 
This was the case with a large measles 
outbreak that took place from 2000-2001 
among four Burundi refugee camps in 
Tanzania. The four camps had been long 
closed to new refugees, but when fighting 
began to increase again, they opened their 
doors and began admitting new individuals. 
Shortly afterward, an outbreak of measles 
swept through the camps, eventually leading 
to over 1000 cases of the disease 
(Kamugisha, Cairns, and Akim, 2003). 
Although vaccination rates for measles in 
the camps were good, new arrivals did not 
have the same vaccination history and the 
outbreak was a continuation of the measles 
outbreak in Burundi that had begun a few 
months earlier (Kamugisha, Cairns, and 
Akim, 2003).  
Finally, armed conflict often leads to 
the mass migration of individuals seeking 
asylum in other countries. Mass migrations 
are not just difficult for the health of the 
individuals traveling, but can have impacts 
on the public health of the host country as 
well. Most developed regions of the world 
no longer struggle with endemic disease, 
but, often, regions with sustained conflict 
have very high rates of diseases that are 
well-controlled or eliminated from 
developed countries (Gushulak and 
MacPherson, 2004). Pakistan experienced 
this effect in the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
when fighting in Afghanistan drove people 
over the border into Pakistan. At this time, 
malaria in the heavily migrated-to regions of 
Pakistan was well under control, but malaria 
in Afghanistan was endemic. These refugees 
brought malaria with them into the refugee 
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camps in Pakistan and, since there were no 
real borders around the camps, malaria was 
re-introduced into the Pakistani population 
of that region (Kazmi and Pandit, 2001). 
Another study by Lopez-Velez, Huerga, and 
Turrientes (2003) found high rates of 
infectious disease among immigrants living 
in Spain and a 2005 study by the Public 
Health Agency of Canada found that 65% of 
tuberculosis cases in Canada are found in 
the foreign-born population. Most recently, 
the WHO renewed their polio vaccination 
campaign in the Middle East after a cluster 
of cases appeared in Syria in 2013 
(Friedrich, 2013). With the appearance of 
polio in Syria and the large amount of 
migrants into Europe, Europe began seeing 
cases of polio last year. These were the first 
cases on the continent since 2010. 
 
Migration From Syria and the Problem of 
Infectious Disease 
Although the Syrian Civil War began 
in March 2011, with “….political, religious, 
and ethnic roots that go back thousands of 
years,” the current conflict has its origins in 
2006/7.  Syria is located in the Fertile 
Crescent and it has been argued by Kelley, 
et. al (2015) that Syria has “1) experienced 
the worst 3-year drought in the instrumental 
record and (2) the drought exacerbated 
existing water and agricultural insecurity 
and caused massive agricultural failures and 
livestock mortality” (p. 3241).  
Consequently, the most significant aspect of 
the drought has been the migration of close 
to 1.5 million people from the rural farming 
areas to the cities.  The migration was also 
shaped by government agricultural policy.   
Hafez al-Assad ruled Syria from 1971-2000 
and implemented policies to increase 
agricultural production, which included land 
redistribution, irrigation projects, quota 
systems, and subsidies for diesel fuel.  The 
hope was that the rural population would 
support the regime.  The reality, however, 
led to the endangerment of Syria’s water 
security “by exploiting limited land and 
water resources without regard for 
sustainability” leading to a decline in 
groundwater (Kelley, et. al., p. 3241).  Syria, 
and the greater Fertile Crescent, then entered 
a period of sustained drought. 
 According to Kelley, et. al (2015), 
“Rural Syria’s heavy year-to-year reliance 
on agricultural production left it unable to 
outlast a severe prolonged drought and a 
mass migration of rural farming families to 
urban areas ensured” (p. 3242).  Those 
displaced by the drought have been 
estimated at approximately 1.5 million 
(Kelley, et. al., p. 3242).  Another important 
factor to consider is the influx of refugees 
from Iraq since the start of the 2003 Iraq 
War.  By 2010, internally displaced persons 
and Iraqi refugees made up approximately 
20% of Syria’s urban population.  Kelley, et. 
al. (2015) note, “The total urban population 
of Syria in 2002 was 8.9 million but, by the 
end of 2010, had grown to 13.8 million, a 
more than 50% increase in only 8 years, a 
far greater rate than for the Syrian 
population as a whole” (p. 3242).  Put 
simply, this created a strain on Syria’s 
already fragile resources.  The drought, 
along with internal migration, came up 
against already existing factors that 
contributed to the unrest that boiled over 
during the Arab Spring; namely, 
unemployment, corruption, and rampant 
inequality.  In their study of the impact of 
climate change in Fertile Crescent, Kelley 
et. al. (2015) argue that the drought did not 
cause the violence, but it was a contributing 
factor.  Climate expert Peter Gleick argues 
in a 2014 study in the journal Weather, 
Climate, and Society, “water and climatic 
conditions have played a direct role in the 
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deterioration of Syria’s economic 
conditions” (Miller, 2015). 
 By March 2011, protests were 
occurring in Deraa, Damascus, and Aleppo. 
Similar to other Arab states caught up in the 
Arab Spring protests, Syria was caught up 
in, “[t]he perfect storm in the Arab world of 
higher commodity prices, which made basic 
items more expensive, and a youth bulge 
that created an irreparable gap between 
mobilization and assimilation threw into 
sharp relief the widespread socioeconomic 
problems (especially gross unequal income 
distribution and growing poverty), 
corruption, and restricted political space 
marked by mukhabarat-enforced 
(security/intelligence) political repression” 
(Lesch, 2017, p. 95).  Assad, however, 
believed Syria was immune and could ride 
out the protests engulfing the other Arab 
states.  Several factors were identified by 
Lesch (2017) which contributed to the 
perspective of the Assad regime: 
1) The regime frequently portrayed 
itself as the only thing standing 
between stability and chaos given its 
turbulent political development. 
2) The fate of the Syrian military and 
security services is closely tied to 
that of the regime. 
3) The minority-ruled Syrian regime, 
infused as it is with Alawites in 
important positions, had always 
represented itself as the protector of 
all minorities in a country that is 65 
percent Sunni Arab. 
4) Basher al-Assad, prior to the 
uprising, was generally well liked in 
the country—or at least not generally 
reviled. 
5) Syria’s internal and external 
opposition prior to the uprising were 
often uncoordinated and divided, 
with no generally recognised 
leadership, and this has carried over 
into the civil war itself (p. 95-97). 
As a result, the Assad regime began to 
crackdown on the protestors and by the late 
summer and fall of 2011 the Syrian Civil 
War became a proxy war.  The conflict 
“developed into something of a stalemate, 
where neither side had the wherewithal to 
land a knockout punch” (Lesch, 2017, p. 
106).  As the civil war escalated, the result 
was internal displacement of civilians and a 
growing refugee crisis requiring the 
attention of the international community.  
As with armed conflicts before it, the 
political in-fighting and social upheaval in 
Syria eventually led to full blown civil war 
and began to impact the health of Syrian 
communities.  This problem has only 
intensified with each passing year of the 
conflict.  We will now turn to the refugee 
crisis and discuss the potential impacts of a 
rise in infectious diseases.       
 
The Rise of Infectious Disease 
The conflict in Syria has resulted in a 
breakdown of healthcare throughout the 
country, contributing to a rise in infectious 
diseases (Petersen, et al., 2013). Diseases 
like polio, cholera, typhoid fever, 
tuberculosis, and leishmaniasis have re-
emerged in Syria and with over 4 million 
Syrians crossing the borders seeking safety, 
EU health care professionals must be 
prepared to address these issues head on. 
Even rabies has re-emerged, due in large 
part to the decreased vaccination rates in the 
Syrian dog population. Although most cases 
of disease re-emergence were originally 
contained within Syria, the continuous 
increase in migration over the past several 
years has led to some degree of spillover. 
In 2014 WHO reported that there 
were 37 cases of polio in Syria and they 
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confirmed regional spread when they 
discovered a case of polio in Iraq. The 2014 
polio case was the first case of polio in Iraq 
since 2000 and genetic sequencing showed 
that it was a close relative of the cases in 
Syria (Leblebicioglu and Ozaras, 2015). 
Thus, it is fair to assume that the case of 
polio in Iraq was imported from Syria. In 
addition to the recent re-emergence of polio, 
Lebanon has seen an increase in tuberculosis 
and cutaneous leishmaniasis rates with the 
migration of Syrians into their country 
(Leblebicioglu and Ozaras, 2015). The 
problems caused by the breakdown of 
healthcare in Syria are now having a 
noticeable impact on the healthcare systems 
of countries taking in Syrian refugees.   
An increase in cases of measles in 
countries hosting Syrian refugees has also 
been documented. The number of measles 
cases throughout Syria in 2014 was in the 
thousands and their mass migration across 
borders led to measles outbreaks in 
neighboring countries (Sharara and Kanj, 
2014). For highly vaccinated populations, 
like Jordan, the problem was mostly 
confined to refugee populations, though it 
does demonstrate the importance of 
maintaining high vaccine coverage in 
countries accepting Syrian refugees. 
Countries with less uniform coverage, such 
as Lebanon, saw a growing rate of measles 
with the incoming refugees. This prompted 
the country to launch a national 
immunization campaign in 2014 (Sharara 
and Kanj, 2014).  
While, to date, the re-emergence of 
previously controlled diseases has been seen 
mostly in states taking in the largest number 
of refugees like Jordan, Lebanon, and 
Turkey, it is not unrealistic to assume that 
the rest of Europe will face similar 
challenges with the influx of more and more 
refugees. Thus, the European health care 
system and health care providers must be 
prepared for the appearance of these cases. 
Vaccination programs, increased disease 
surveillance, and health screenings can all 
help prevent diseases that may be traveling 
with Syrian refugees from entering the 
greater European public.  We now turn to a 
discussion of the EU’s efforts at confronting 
migration and the consequences of the EU’s 
migration policy on the rise of infectious 
diseases.   
Throughout 2015, a rise in migration 
to Europe from the Syrian Civil War, as well 
as conflicts in Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and 
Yemen, resulted in one million people 
entering Europe mainly crossing the 
Mediterranean (Collett, 2017, p. 150).  
Consequently, states in southern Europe 
were the frontline in the emerging crisis; 
namely, Italy and Greece.  The reaction of 
Europe’s politicians can be summarised as 
follows: “[A]s some governments scrambled 
to construct makeshift reception centers in 
resorts and army barracks, others looked on 
with indifference, and still more did so with 
alarm” (Collett, 2017, p. 150).  In short, 
disagreement among European states came 
down to whose responsibility it was to 
shoulder the monetary, social and political 
costs of the spikes in immigration 
throughout 2015.  Germany has taken in the 
largest numbers of refugees in absolute 
terms, while Sweden has more on a per 
capita basis.  Moreover, Italy and Greece, as 
frontline states, have absorbed more 
refugees, often creating holding or 
processing areas.  Migration expert Kelly M. 
Greenhill argues, “Brussels has been 
markedly slow in providing much needed 
aid to frontline states as well as in 
facilitating promised resettlement of 
migrants and refugees to other parts of the 
EU, creating bottlenecks and turning these 
ill-equipped states into vast holding camps, 
which Greek ministers refer to as ‘a 
cemetery of souls’” (Greenhill, 2016, p. 
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319).  Therefore, the refugee crisis has 
created a stark challenge for the liberal 
democracies of the EU: “Balancing 
humanitarian responsibilities with the need 
to manage migration, while heeding the 
desires and fears of European publics….” 
(Collett, 2017, p. 152). 
 Prior to the creation of the EU, 
migration policy was coordinated at the 
national level.  However, “migration policy 
only started to concern [the] EU, in legal 
and political terms, since 1997 with the 
Treaty of Amsterdam which integrated into 
the EU body of law all the migration 
legislation made by member states of the 
Schengen Agreement” (Zodian, 2015, p. 
298).  Visa, asylum, and immigration laws 
would now be coordinated supranationally 
with the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 
2009, “complet[ing] the political and legal 
inclusion of the migration policies within the 
EU treaty framework” (Zodian, 2015, p. 
299).  Member states eliminated border 
controls to improve labor mobility, but there 
were labor mobility restrictions put in place 
on Central and Eastern European countries 
joining the EU during 2004 and 2007.  
While migration has been part of global life 
for many years, Europe’s view of migration 
and immigration can be summed up as 
follows: “Europe has no Statue of Liberty.  
It is chiefly a continent not of immigrants, 
where all citizens can trace their ancestry to 
somewhere abroad, but of discrete peoples’ 
troublesome pride, and the wars it long 
spawned, was the reason behind the EU, 
first conceived decades ago to provide a 
unifying identity that erased borders and 
shared the wealth” (Vick, 2015, p. 11-12). 
 From May until September 2015, the 
EU sought to improve coordination of 
immigration policy and respond to the crisis 
by developing operational, budgetary, and 
legal measures as part of a 4-point plan 
dealing with “irregular immigration”: 
“protecting the EU borders by strengthening 
Frontex, establishing a European Border and 
Co[a]st Guard; a long-term, EU-wide 
system…[of] resettlement and reallocation; 
a credible and effective return policy…[and] 
opening legal channels for migration” 
(Zodian, 2015, p. 302). At the supranational 
level, human rights have historically been 
given credence in policymaking, but more 
recently member states “are split on how to 
respond to these refugees, and these splits 
are growing more acute over time” 
(Greenhill, 2016, p. 324).  The rise, recently, 
of far right nationalism in Europe led to 
many unilateral, national responses over 
universalistic, supranational responses 
(Greenhill, 2016, p. 324).  For example, in 
November 2016, the European Commission 
President Jean-Claude Juncker unveiled an 
asylum sharing plan to deal with the 120,000 
refugees in Greece, Italy, and Hungary and 
have the refugees shared among the EU’s 28 
member states.  Hungarian Prime Minister 
Viktor Orban responded stating, “‘We have 
to take care of the problem where it 
exists….If Greece is not capable of 
protecting its borders, we need to mobilise 
European forces to the Greek borders so that 
they can achieve the goals of European 
law’” (Jahn,, 2015). Greenhill (2016) argues 
that responses such as Orban’s denote buck-
passing or the embracing of beggar thy 
neighbor policies (p. 324). 
In response to the disparate 
nationalist sentiments expressed by Orban 
and other Eastern European leaders closer to 
the frontline of the crisis, the EU sought to 
develop migrant deals with individual states 
to improve coordination.  The EU 
Commission created Partnership 
Frameworks with the ultimate aim that the 
EU and its Member States acting “in a 
coordinated manner putting together 
instruments, tools and leverage to reach 
comprehensive partnerships (compacts) with 
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third countries to better manage migration in 
full respect of our humanitarian and 
humanitarian and human rights obligations” 
(EU document, 2016, p. 581).  The EU and 
Turkey signed a Partnership Framework on 
March 18, 2016.  The Framework initiated 
two processes: the return of refugees from 
the Greek Islands to Turkey to “make clear 
that this is a dangerous route and the wrong 
route” and the resettlement of Syrian 
refugees from Turkey to Europe (European 
Commission, p. 2016).  According to the 
European Commission, “So far, 511 Syrian 
refugees have been resettled [as of June 
2016] from Turkey to Europe.  The return of 
462 migrants who had not made asylum 
applications in Greece has been carried out 
from the Greek islands to Turkey….In the 
weeks before the implementation of the 
Statement, around 1,740 migrants were 
crossing the Aegean Sea to the Greek 
islands every day.  By contrast the daily 
arrivals since 1 May are down to 47, a 
decrease of over 95%” (European 
Commission, 2016).   
The implementation of the 
Framework is handled by the European 
Commission with the EU pledging to pay 
Turkey 3 billion Euros, allow visa free travel 
to Europe for Turkey’s citizens, and restart 
accession talks for Turkey to join the EU in 
exchange for Turkey agreeing to take back 
migrants and refugees who arrive in Greece 
via Turkey (Kern, 2016).  Turkish President 
Recep Tayyip Erdogan, however, has come 
out against the migrant deal arguing that 
“‘EU leaders are dishonest….We have stood 
by our promise.  But have the Europeans 
kept theirs?” (Kern, 2016).  Erdogan was 
unhappy that Turkey had only received 2 
million Euros of the promised 3 billion 
Euros.  Erdogan’s critics charge that he “is 
exploiting Europe’s strategic weaknesses to 
advance Turkish imperialism and his goal of 
Islamizing the continent….since Erdogan 
sees himself both domestically and 
internationally as a religious cultural 
warrior—as the patron saint of Islamist 
expansion” (Kern, 2016). 
As a consequence, the EU will 
confront some fundamental questions in the 
coming year.  As Collett (2017) notes, “Will 
the EU remain committed to its founding 
liberal principles?  Can the EU preserve 
freedom of movement without reaching 
common ground on asylum policies?  And 
what is the future of the global system of 
international protection for refugees, as 
some of the strongest champions of the 
current approach start looking seriously for 
alternatives?” (p. 154).  These questions 
have come up due to the newer EU member 
states, known as the Visegrad Four—the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and 
Slovakia—repudiating their commitment to 
the 1951 UN Refugee Convention.  These 
four states have said hosting refugees is not 
for them despite the fact they signed up to 
do so under the Common European Asylum 
System when they joined the EU in 2004 
(Collett, 2017, p. 154).  Collett (2017) 
continues, arguing “If member states cannot 
trust one another to assume similar 
responsibilities with respect to border 
management, asylum, immigration, and 
security, they will be more likely to 
prioritise narrow national interests, as they 
did when they reinstated temporary border 
controls across the EU in 2015” (p. 154).  
States such as Austria, Germany, Italy, and 
Malta, in response, proposed “external 
processing” which “corral[s] people in 
neighboring countries and offering 
resettlement to those deemed worthy, 
thereby providing refugees with safer, legal 
routes to Europe,” but has come under 
increasing pressure by human rights groups 
saying that the process would be at risk of 
being more vulnerable to political pressure 
and to exploitation by leaders, such as 
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Erdogan, who seek to exploit to their 
advantage (Collett, 2017, p. 154-6). 
 
Recommendations for Counteracting 
Disease Spread through Migration 
As we discuss in the previous 
section, the mass migration of people from 
Syria has put significant strain on the 
European Union. There has been increased 
economic pressure from supporting 
thousands of new arrivals, challenges with 
housing and community integration, and 
lastly new health issues that stress the public 
health infrastructure and put the health of 
citizens and refugees at risk. Many Syrians 
have traveled long distances, are 
malnourished, and may not have had 
appropriate vaccinations or access to any 
form of health care for long periods of time. 
We provide three recommendations for 
addressing the health issues posed by 
refugees coming into the EU from Syria that 
we believe can help mitigate the 
introduction of diseases. 
The first recommendation is to 
provide training of local health care 
practitioners. Most of the diseases that 
Syrian refugees are bringing into the EU are 
not common to Europe, but they are 
common in Syria. The most common 
disease coming into the EU from Syria is 
cutaneous leishmaniasis, but it is not the 
only one. Educating health care 
professionals in Europe about the signs, 
symptoms, and method of transmission for 
the most common diseases appearing with 
the movement of Syrian refugees would help 
clinics to be better prepared to diagnosis and 
treat the diseases when they identify their 
symptoms. Knowledge about the diseases 
would help eliminate delay in diagnosis and 
treatment and eliminating this delay could 
prevent a large-scale outbreak. If health care 
professionals are given all the tools they 
need to fight the new diseases, the threat to 
the European public and the refugee 
communities will be greatly reduced.  
Our second recommendation is to 
provide health screening upon entry for 
those refugees entering the EU through 
formal channels. These screenings should 
include a routine medical examination, 
appropriate vaccinations, and testing for 
infectious diseases common in Syria. If 
infectious diseases are identified, the refugee 
should be started on the proper treatment 
and contained at the port of entry until the 
treatment protocol is complete. Once the 
treatment is complete they will be allowed 
to be integrated into the community. The 
purpose of the entry health screenings is to 
identify and treat diseases before they have 
an opportunity to spread into the population. 
European Parliament, the European Council, 
and the European Commission have all 
recognised that the health of refugees can no 
longer be ignored. Both Parliament and the 
Commission have committed millions of 
Euros to supporting the healthcare of 
migrants and have discussed the importance 
of identifying diseases and other conditions 
as they enter the EU.  
Lastly, because large amounts of 
Syrian refugees are not entering the EU 
through formal channels, health outreach 
must be conducted in refugee communities, 
regardless of their legal status. Funding 
should be secured for health care teams to 
go out into refugee communities on a 
monthly basis offering free medical care, 
vaccinations, and infectious disease 
diagnostic test. This will help the EU 
identify diseases that may be circulating in 
refugee communities and prevent them from 
finding their way into the larger population. 
Additionally, it provides refugees who may 
be afraid to seek health care because of their 
illegal status, the opportunity to be treated. 
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Health care teams could also offer education 
and training regarding some of the most 




The EU’s refugee crisis came to a 
head in 2015. EU member states were beset 
with a host of political and social issues.  An 
important issue that has not received enough 
attention has been the potential for 
infectious diseases as a result of increased 
migration from crisis.  This paper examined 
the extent of the crisis and specifically how 
Europe responded. We hypothesised that the 
increased prevalence of infectious diseases 
occurs as a result of public health 
breakdowns during and following armed 
conflict.  The Syrian refugee crisis put huge 
strains on EU member states’ immigration 
systems, which often lacked coordination 
among the states confronting the crisis.  In 
short, at the supranational level there was 
little coordination, despite efforts in 2015 
and 2016 to address the coordination 
problem.   
Mitigating the crisis will take a 
coordinated effort and, given the importance 
of public health, we offer a small part of 
what will need to be a multipronged 
approach by addressing what can be done to 
better prepare the EU for what will likely be 
continued migrants.  Our recommendations 
were: 1) Local Training of health care 
practitioners; 2) Provide health screening 
upon entry for those refugees entering the 
EU through formal channels; and 3) Health 
outreach in refugee communities in Europe 
and in the country of origin.   Since 2015, 
the European Parliament, the European 
Council, and the European Commission 
have committed large amounts of resources.  
Despite resistance from Turkey, and far-
right parties in Europe, the issue of refugee 
migration is not dissipating.   
As the Syrian Civil War approaches 
year six, a coordinated policy, taking the 
concerns of EU members, both those footing 
the bill and those accepting refugees, into 
account could serve as a template for the 
international community on how to 
effectively deal with large-scale 
humanitarian crises moving forward.  Collett 
(2017) puts the stakes for the EU in the 
years ahead nicely: “[I]t must remember that 
any fundamental overhaul of asylum policy 
will require detailed planning, a long-term 
commitment to resettlement, and a 
recognition that such a policy will yield 
broader geopolitical consequences.  And 
Europe’s leaders must not forget the 
principles of human rights that have 
underpinned their countries’ asylum policies 
for decades—and that lie at the core of the 
European project itself” (p. 156).  A health 
policy regarding infectious diseases will be 
the first in a series of steps to mitigate a 
crisis with regional and global implications 
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